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‘Within an hour’s ride of the capital’: The problem of sovereignty in 1859.   
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores a number of Aboriginal attacks on white settlers and on the 
Native Police in the northern suburbs of Brisbane in the years 1853 to 1859.  These 
are the years leading up to the separation of Queensland, and its creation as a self-
governing colony of the British empire with the township of Brisbane as its capital in 
December 1859.  Despite the role of some Aboriginal people in assisting officers of 
the law on occasion over this three decade history, Aboriginal political structures 
remained strong; the reception of British law by many traditional owners was still 
down the barrel of a gun and their own laws insisted upon at the point of a spear.  
The paper shows how ineffectual colonial policing of these districts was in order to 
show that British territorial sovereignty had not been established even within an 
hour’s ride of the capital of the new colony in these years. It thus contributes to the 
literature on the problematic legal status of the Australian colonies.   
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
On 15 April 1858 a detachment of eight Native Police troopers under the command of 
Lieutenant Williams came under sudden and unexpected attack while patrolling Mrs Griffin’s 
Whiteside station on the Pine River in what is now known as southern Queensland.  Despite 
responding to a complaint from Mrs Griffin the detachment was caught off-guard when it 
came upon a large Aboriginal camp in the scrubs along the river which ran through her 
station.  The Aboriginal trooper to the left of Lieutenant Williams was speared in the throat 
and fell instantly, eight or nine spears piercing his body.  Lieutenant Williams promptly 
regrouped his men and ordered them to return fire.  He estimated ten minutes of firing by the 
detachment before the tribal men dispersed.  At the end of the encounter, as well as the death 
of Trooper John, Troopers Charlie and Mark were injured while six warriors had fallen and 
two were injured.  The Moreton Bay Courier reported that John was buried near the spot 
where he fell in the scrub and that the loss to ‘the blacks’ was not known suggesting the 
potential for some literary licence regarding the numbers of tribesmen killed either by the 
press or by Lieutenant Williams in his official report.1    
 
A number of interesting features can be discerned from the sparse official and newspaper 
reports of the incident.  This station had been continually occupied since 1843 but fifteen 
years later the Aboriginal people of the Pine River and the coastal people referred to in the 
colonial press as the Ningy Ningy had clearly not conceded this portion of their lands.  The 
trees surrounding the camp were hung with fresh carcasses of beef suggesting measures were 
underway to feed a large assembly of people.  The newspaper report claimed that 300 men 
attacked the Native Police patrol – it seems some kind of regional gathering of perhaps 500 or 
more men, women and children was taking place at the time on these lands which were an 
important Aboriginal crossroads. Although the Courier confidently described the attackers as 
                                                 
1 Drawn from J.C. Wickham, Government Resident Moreton Bay to Colonial Secretary, 21 April 1858, l/no. 
58/1492 & enclosure in Col Sec: Letters received re Moreton Bay 1858 A2/39 QSA & Moreton Bay Courier 24 
April 1858, p.2. [hereafter MBC] 
 3 
 
Ningy Ningy, the covering letter to Lieut Williams’ official report from the Government 
Resident for Moreton Bay, emphasised that it was ‘the Natives occupying the sea coast 
between the Brisbane River, and Wide Bay [who] have been for a length of time very 
troublesome, and an absolute terror to the Settlers in the more immediate vicinity of Sandgate 
and the Pine Rivers.’  White authorities were anxiously aware of the hostility of all the 
traditional owners from this 200 kilometre stretch of coastline and that given the traditional 
social and political organisation of this region any of them could have been participating in 
ceremonies hosted by the peoples of the Pine Rivers district. Traditional ceremonial and 
political life remained strong.  Secondly, this was a concerted attack on white authority.  The 
newspaper report noted that the warriors shouted in English ‘kill the white fellow’ and ‘you 
bloody coward’.  The reporter assumed that the discipline and ‘forbearance’ of the troopers 
had been interpreted by the warriors as cowardice but to traditional fighting men the lack of 
an open challenge and the uneven match of weaponry and horses all made this style of 
fighting an affront to their code of traditional martial chivalry.  After thirty-four years of 
contact with British settlers, the northern peoples generally had a good command of English, 
but their reference points remained their own political and legal values which had not been 
surrendered in the face of the firepower of either the white town police or the Native Police.   
 
To European eyes this attack was shocking because it occurred within districts which were 
long presumed to be “occupied”. This part of Whiteside Station was less than twenty-eight 
kilometres due north of the township of Brisbane and it was less than ten kilometres from 
Redcliffe, the first site of attempted settlement for a new penal station.  The Redcliffe 
settlement had been abandoned in 1825, in part because of attacks by the Ningy Ningy, and 
the penal station moved to what became the central business district of Brisbane, later the 
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colonial and then state capital of Queensland.2 The first pastoralists had begun arriving in 
Brisbane’s hinterland in August-September 1841 and the nearest sheep run to the north was 
the station of Durundur, fifty kilometres north of Whiteside.  A prohibition on entering penal 
stations prevented settlement any nearer to Brisbane Town until May 1842 when the district 
was declared open for free settlement.  So by the time of this April 1858 attack European 
settlers had been well established north and south of the Pine Rivers district for a third of a 
century.   
 
Administration from Sydney had struggled to keep pace with the growing population in the 
north, however.  The first police magistrate and town police were appointed in January 1843 
but the surrounding pastoral districts of Moreton Bay and the Darling Downs were managed 
by commissioners of crown lands and their detachments of Border Police. With the recall of 
New South Wales governor, Sir George Gipps, and the repeal of his Squatting Regulations 
the Border Police had to be disbanded at the end of 1846.  Despite pastoralist opposition to 
the Border Police, there was a political outcry when it became apparent that there was no 
longer any force with responsibility for rural policing.  In straitened financial circumstances, 
the new governor Sir Charles FitzRoy then ordered the recruitment of Native Police 
detachments for northern New South Wales including the pastoral districts which would 
become Queensland.  The Native Police had operated in the Port Phillip district since 1838; 
their reconstitution in the north was under a white commandant, Frederick Walker, with 
white lieutenants or sergeants in charge of detachments of eight or so Aboriginal troopers.  
These troopers were paid much less than white town police and were recruited from 
southwest New South Wales for service in lands that there were far removed from their kin, 
their country and language group.  Walker’s force was to commence operations in 1848 and 
                                                 
2 Ray Evans, A History of Queensland, Melbourne, 2007, pp. 32-33; W. Ross Johnston, Brisbane: The First 30 
Years, Brisbane, 1988, p. 19.   
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by May 1850 legal and administrative support for northern districts was further augmented 
with the first sittings in Brisbane of the New South Wales Supreme Court on circuit.3   These 
trappings of British law and order more than a 1000 kilometres north of Sydney appear 
impressive but their appearance is misleading.  Aboriginal people as long as they remained 
outside the town boundaries were beyond the reach of the law as events in the 1850s were to 
prove. The insecurity of the northern and coastal suburbs of Brisbane naturally was deeply 
disturbing for the white community but it also raises interesting questions about claims of 
sovereignty just fourteen months before the announcement of the new British colony of 
Queensland in June 1859.   
 
Recent law and history scholarship on sovereignty has helped to challenge assumptions that 
the legal status of the Australian colonies was unproblematic for governors or for the courts.  
Australian work on ‘porous’ and uneven frontier zones4 fits productively with international 
scholarship such as that of Lauren Benton which emphasises the imperfect geography of 
empires.  European empires expanded unevenly along river and trade corridors and via 
enclaves so that Benton argues the notion of borders and frontiers should be replaced by a 
notion of ‘spaces in which imperial sovereignty was contested.’5  This approach is reinforced 
by Julie Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly and Patrick Wolfe who have described 
settler-colonial frontiers as a region which ‘sporadically and discontinuously consumes and 
                                                 
3 . L.E. Skinner, Police of the Pastoral Frontier: Native Police 1849-59, St Lucia (Qld), 1975, pp. 26-27.  
Regarding pay, in 1857, ordinary constables in town police were paid 5s 6d per day; whereas native police 
troopers were paid 5d per day.   ‘Estimates 1857’ in Joint Volumes of Papers presented to the Legislative 
Council and Legislative Assembly, New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, 1857, [no pp].  On commencement 
of circuit courts see Libby Connors, ‘The Birth of the Prison and the “death” of convictism’, Doctor of 
Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 1990, pp. 313-315.   
4 Luke Godwin, ‘The fluid frontier: Central Queensland 1845-63’ in Lynette Russell (ed) Colonial frontiers: 
Indigenous-European Encounters in Settler Societies, Manchester, 2001, pp. 108, 116.   
5 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900, Cambridge, 
2010, p. 37.   
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disgorges Indigenous space.’6 Antony Anghie argues that European assertions of territory 
were part of the ideological underpinnings imperialism but a critique of their claims remains 
essential since the system of modern international law rests on them.7  Some Australian 
scholars, however, have noted that imperial administrators were less confident of their 
sovereign authority than the modern nation-state recognises.  Lisa Ford and Brent Salter, for 
example, have explored New South Wales Governor Macquarie’s conceptualisation of the 
limits of legal authority in the Mow-watty case of 1816.8  Ford emphasises the implicit legal 
pluralism which early governors assumed operated on New South Wales’ and Georgia’s 
frontiers; only after 1830 was sovereignty equated with territorial jurisdiction.9  Nonetheless 
Simon Cooke’s work on inter se cases before the Victorian colonial courts in 1860 shows that 
legal opinion in that colony had not been settled by R v Murrell in 183610 as is so often 
assumed in law texts.   
 
The issue had first been put on the Australian academic agenda by Henry Reynolds whose 
1996 book surveyed legal views of sovereignty from Roman times to the present including 
countervailing views to R v Murrell from Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia in 
colonial Australia.11  In a seminar presentation to Macquarie University in 2005 Reynolds 
focused on the international law which had been established by the Berlin Conference of 
1885 and which Britain had accepted – that claims to sovereignty must be able to prove 
                                                 
6 Julie Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly & Patrick Wolfe, ‘Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility’ in Julie 
Evans, Ann Genovese, Alexander Reilly & Patrick Wolfe (eds) Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility, Honolulu, 
2013, p. 11.  
7 Antony Anghie, ‘Western Discourses of Sovereignty’ in Evans et al, Sovereignty, pp. 19-36.   
8 Lisa Ford & Brent Salter, ‘From Pluralism to Territorial Sovereignty: The 1816 Trial of Mow-watty in the 
Superior Court of  New South Wales’  Indigenous Law Journal, Vol. 7, 2008, pp. 67-86.    
9 Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia 1788-1836, 
Cambridge Ma., 2010, pp. 54, 203.   
10 Simon Cooke, ‘Arguments for the Survival of Aboriginal Customary Law in Victoria: A case note on R v 
Peter (1860) and R v Jemmy (1860)’ Australian Journal of Legal History Vol. 5, 1999, pp. 201-241.  See also 
Janine Rizzetti, ‘Judge Willis, Bonjon and the recognition of Aboriginal Law’  ANZLH E-Journal, 2011, 
Refereed paper 5, pp. 1-26.  
11 Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty: Reflections on Race, State and Nation, St Leonards NSW, 1996.    
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actual occupation or effective administrative control over territory.12  It is an important point 
that Kent McNeil has taken up with respect to Canada and the United States and their 
grandiose claims over the Northern Plains to the detriment of the Lakota, Cheyenne, Crow, 
Blackfoot, Gros Ventre, Assiniboine, Cree and other Indigenous peoples of the region.13  It is 
this aspect of the colonising of Queensland that this article focuses on.  While Great Britain 
would require other powers to prove territorial jurisdiction for their colonial claims to be 
upheld, some twenty-six years earlier Westminster had granted territorial sovereignty to a 
small group of colonists whose hold not only over the vast territory that the Queen named 
eponymously, but even over their planned capital, was tenuous.   Despite the absence of 
effective administrative control, even over the suburbs of Brisbane, the campaign for the 
creation of a separate colony of Queensland proceeded apace in the 1850s and was won in 
1859.  While there were also interesting examples of a lack of any attempt to enforce British 
law in many cases of Aboriginal-Aboriginal and even Aboriginal-European assaults in the 
north in the years 1842 to 1859, consistent with an implicit recognition of legal pluralism and 
of a lack of territorial jurisdiction, it was the inability of whites to occupy coastal and 
northern suburbs of Brisbane thirty-five years after first settlement that proves the actuality of 
Indigenous territorial control and sovereignty over much of southeast Queensland even at the 
time of proclamation of the new colony.   
 
As part of the Macquarie research seminar series a number of scholars were asked to respond 
to Reynolds’ paper.  Among the critical voices, Alexander Reilly made the point that ‘if the 
British could only secure sovereignty over these areas through occupation or effective 
administrative control, there is probably a reasonable legal argument that these conditions 
                                                 
12 Henry Reynolds, ‘Reviving Indigenous Sovereignty?’ Macquarie Law Journal, Vol. 6, 2006, pp. 5-12.    
13 Kent McNeil, ‘Factual and legal Sovereignty in North America: Indigenous Realities and Euro-American 
Pretensions’ in Evans et al, Sovereignty, pp. 37-59.   
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were satisfied by the time land was divided into titles granted of and from the Crown.’14  The 
interesting aspect of the Queensland capital’s story is that land sales had been made and title 
deeds issued, but the northern tribes successfully ejected new settlers in a strip along the coast 
that stretched from the river mouth to the northwards approaching the next coastal township 
of Maryborough.   The events to be explored here show that awarding title and dividing land 
based on maps in Brisbane and Sydney were not proof of effective administrative control.  
This article discusses the problems settlers in Brisbane’s north faced when the courts sought 
to enforce British law on one Aboriginal leader and the success of Aboriginal defence of the 
coastal lands between the years 1853 and 1859.   
  
By November 1853, eleven years and six months after the northern districts had been thrown 
open to free settlement and twenty-nine years since the penal outpost of Moreton Bay had 
originally been established, the township of Brisbane on the northside of the river did not 
stretch beyond Breakfast Creek where a number of farms had been established.  There were 
also settlers at the original German mission at Nundah which had been founded in 1838 and 
at Eagle Farm but between these settlements and the town was bushland.  Beyond these 
suburbs were Darby McGrath’s sheep station at the Gap and James Cash’s cattle run on the 
South Pine River which had only been leased in 1851 and 1852.  They were 10 and 18 
kilometres north of the township respectively and today The Gap is a suburb of Brisbane 
while the eastern reaches of the South Pine form the most northerly boundary of the city of 
Brisbane.  The track that was the Old Northern Road continued past Cash’s river crossing to 
cattle stations at Samsonvale and Whiteside which had been established in 1845 and 1843 
respectively and on to Durundur established in 1841.   It was a settlement pattern consistent 
with Godwin’s analysis of a ‘mosaic’ of uneven settlement in the frontier districts of central 
                                                 
14 ‘Responses to Henry Reynolds’, Macquarie Law Journal, Vol.6, 2006, p. 22.  For a more detailed and recent 
consideration of Reilly’s view on Australian Indigenous sovereignty, see Reilly, ‘Sovereign Apologies’ in Evans 
et al, Sovereignty, pp. 196-219.   
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Queensland.15  New European settlers and residents of Brisbane, however, imagined all this 
region to their north as “settled” country and there was much enthusiasm when the 
government announced a land sale of suburban allotments which was to include good 
farming land at the Bald Hills and seaside allotments at Sandgate in October 1853.   
 
The sales took place at the courthouse on 9 and 10 November 1853.  More than 55 lots were 
sold and buyers included, prosperous squatters, such as the three McConnel brothers, 
Brisbane Police Magistrate and Sheriff for the northern districts, William Brown, former 
missionary Leopold Zillman and Thomas Dowse, a local auctioneer, merchant and Moreton 
Bay correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald.  Influential locals had invested their 
money in Sandgate lands and the government raised more than £1957 from the sales.16   
 
The first purchaser to attempt to build on his block was Thomas Dowse who set up on his 
allotment at Sandgate with his two sons on 3 December 1853.  Late in the afternoon about 
thirty local Aboriginal people came to their camp and tried to solicit food and tobacco.  
Dowse was an ex-convict businessman who had done well for himself in early Brisbane.17  
He had no intention of sharing his provisions and he and his sons succeeded in driving the 
Aboriginal locals away who were not at all happy about his lack of generosity on their lands.  
As night fell Dowse realised that he and his sons were vulnerable and made the decision to 
pack up and return to Brisbane.  The problem was that they had to wait for the tide to turn to 
launch their boat.  Aboriginal people knew the tides too and at 2.00am they returned just as 
the tide was lifting and attacked Dowse on the back of the head with a waddy as he tried to 
                                                 
15 Godwin, ‘Fluid Frontier’, p. 109.   
16 MBC 12 November 1853, p.2, 11 March 1854, p. 2 & 13 May 1854, p. 2.   
17 Mark Gosling, ‘Thomas Dowse: Brisbane’s Samuel Pepys’ in Rod Fisher & Jennifer Harrison (eds) Brisbane: 
Squatters, Settlers and Surveyors, Brisbane, 2000, pp. 102-109.   
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make for the boat.  The younger son Thomas was speared in the leg and the party was saved 
by Henry Dowse firing ‘point blank at a youth and the native was seen to fall.’18   
 
Dowse should have been more alert to the coastal peoples’ intentions.  He had already run 
into trouble trying to secure timber for his general store when his contracted cedar rafters had 
been plundered by a large group of Aborigines just three months earlier in September.  They 
had camped at Luggage Point near the mouth of the Brisbane River and while the two men 
were adjusting their raft Aborigines led by a Joondaburri man from Bribie Island helped 
themselves to their food supplies.  The white men forlornly begged to be left some stores 
which was refused; their bedding and weapons were also taken.  The guns the Aboriginal 
party pointedly returned to them after destroying the barrels.19  The Ningy Ningy, 
Joondaburri and Gubbi Gubbi from the Sunshine Coast to the north had been successfully 
working together for many years and had made clear that they were not going to allow any 
new settlers onto the coastal lands between Brisbane and Wide Bay.   
 
The unequivocal defiance of the northern peoples was made clear when the Brisbane police 
succeeded in arresting their leader Dundalli, a Joondaburri warrior from Bribie Island in the 
northern part of Moreton Bay, in Brisbane in May 1854.  A warrant had been out for his 
arrest for murder for more than eight years but the Brisbane police knew they had no hope of 
arresting him in his own territory.  When informers told Chief Constable Sneyd of Dundalli’s 
presence in the township, Sneyd remained pessimistic but nonetheless sent two constables in 
plain clothes.  To Sneyd’s surprise they were able to effect the arrest with the help of 
                                                 
18 In his recollections, Dowse said his elder son Henry was also hit by a boomerang.  Thomas Dowse, 
Recollections of old times in Moreton Bay: a transcript of the original manuscript, pp. 14-15 OM79-68, JOL; 
MBC 10 December 1853, p.2.   
19 MBC 24 September 1853, p. 2.   
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Dundalli’s local Aboriginal political opponents.20   The Chief Constable’s problems did not 
end with Dundalli’s incarceration, however.  In the months that followed large numbers of 
Aboriginal people ‘from the northern coast of the bay ... commonly called the “Ningy Ningy” 
tribes’ gathered in Brisbane and at the Pine Rivers to debate “payback” for the Brisbane 
Mianjin people who had engineered Dundalli’s capture.  The local newspaper called them 
Ningy Ningy but reported a leading Joondaburri man was one of the participants at these 
gatherings and it is highly unlikely that Dundalli’s countrymen would have been absent from 
this discussion and planning.  Aboriginal internal governance was of no concern to the local 
press – the Courier’s objection was to them assembling within the township and near white 
settlers for they ‘cause[d] much loss and annoyance to the settlers in the suburbs of the town, 
and much anxiety to those on the Pine River.’21  By October, the Sydney Morning Herald 
correspondent was describing the continued ominous presence of these young Joondaburri 
men and their supporters as ‘native infantry’ and the ‘scouts of Dundalli’s tribe’ who as 
‘spies and rovers ought to be frightened back to their own hunting grounds’.22  There was 
little the Chief Constable could do to prevent these gatherings given the small number of 
town police under his command and the fact that they were unmounted.  His police district 
nominally extended from south of the Brisbane River to the boundary of the Wide Bay 
pastoral district and to cover this territory he had eleven ordinary constables and one district 
constable with only the district and chief constables provided with horses.23   
 
Community anxiety about the coastal lands near Brisbane were only accentuated when two 
white members of the Harbour Master’s boat crew, Joseph Goold and Thomas Anderson, 
went missing in October 1854.  Although Bribie Islanders as well as Quandamooka people 
                                                 
20 Daily Mail, 21 January 1924, p. 9;  Memories of E.E. Caswell, Early Brisbane Clippings 1894-1947, OM 91-
36, Box 9256, JOL.   
21 MBC 26 August 1854, p.2.   
22 Sydney Morning Herald 3 October 1854, p. 5.   
23 Connors, ‘The Birth of the Prison and the “death” of convictism’, p. 154.   
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from Stradbroke and Moreton Islands had been used as boat crews for the Pilot Station and 
Harbour Master’s boats since penal days, and in more recent times as pilots and crew for 
white fishermen, the utter disregard that local Aboriginal men had for white authority was 
now publicly aired.  Local Indigenous people happily engaged in trade over labour and goods 
but they were still living on their own lands and had not surrendered their political structures, 
values or world view.  The Harbour Master’s abandoned boat was soon found at Sandgate 
along with marks of a violent struggle and no sign of the white men who were presumed 
murder. The abandoned boat was a shocking reminder that whites did not control the bay or 
the coast lands despite the large and growing sea traffic to and from Brisbane and the 
Moreton Bay Courier now editorialised against the practice of employing Aboriginal men as 
boat crews.  It evocatively drew attention to the extent of Aboriginal control over northern 
Moreton Bay:   
Within thirteen miles of North Brisbane is the surveyed village of Sandgate at 
Cabbage Tree Creek.  At this spot large quantities of land have been sold at high 
prices by the Government, and some thousands of pounds have been invested by 
persons anxious to build upon and improve the place forthwith.  Yet ... no person 
dares to attempt to improve his land within an hour’s ride of the capital because his 
life would be in danger from the attacks of the natives ... All along the northern shore 
of the bay is one dreary waste of bush, entirely abandoned to the blacks ... At this very 
spot we learn that the blacks landed on the late melancholy occasion, and perhaps it 
was here – where but for the grossest neglect a thriving village population might now 
be established – that the murderous assault was made. 
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The inability of policing officials to act following this attack infuriated the paper.  Later in 
the editorial it decried ‘the coolness that succeeds such events is astonishing.  All hope of 
arresting the murderers [of Goold and Anderson] seems to be abandoned’.24     
 
The Brisbane authorities had few options.  There had been incessant demands for the Native 
Police to be used in Brisbane but that force had faced constant logistical problems since its 
northern establishment in 1848, including the ill-health of troopers and officers who spent so 
much time in the field.25  In 1850 Frederick Walker, the commandant of the force, had been 
authorised to undertake further recruitment and expansion of the force26 but demand for its 
patrols always outstripped its capacity and its management became the subject of angry 
political disputes among pastoralists.  From late 1852 to mid-1853 Walker spent several 
months heading a detachment which patrolled the Brisbane Valley and districts to the north 
of Brisbane.  The detachment was successful in arresting two young Aboriginal men from the 
Pine Rivers who were accused of offences committed during an attack in 1846 and the 
commandant boasted that they had successfully disrupted attendance at that summer’s 
Bunya-Bunya gathering,27 but assaults on stations resumed when the force departed to other 
pressing duties at Wide Bay and the Burnett.   
 
The Whiteside and Samsonvale stations had suffered from Aboriginal incursions since their 
foundations in the 1840s but in September 1855 the organised nature of Aboriginal resistance 
to incursions on their land was made clear.  In that month Mrs Griffin discovered bush 
barricades in the bed of a creek on Whiteside station which had been constructed by 
                                                 
24 MBC 28 October 1854, p. 2.  Goold was also known as Gould and had a criminal record so it is not out of the 
question that he caused some offence to his Aboriginal crew.  See MBC 13 February 1855, p. 2.   
25 Walker to E. Deas Thomson Enclosure in l/no. 52/3069 CSIL: 1852 4/3075 SRNSW.    
26 MBC 31 January 1852, p. 2.   
27 This was a regular regional assembly of Aboriginal peoples which was held in the Sunshine Coast hinterland 
at a site now covered by the waters of the Baroon Dam.  MBC 27 November 1852, p. 3; Maitland Mercury & 
Hunter River General Advertiser 20 April 1853, p. 4.   
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Aboriginal people in order to muster and spear cattle systematically.  The Pine River Valley 
was an important meeting place for neighbouring traditional owners including the coastal 
tribes so the systematic harvesting of beef to feed large meetings was an interesting 
adaptation.  However since the barricades could have entrapped more bullocks than the Pine 
River people could eat, it is possible that another motivation was to disrupt the station’s 
productivity.28    
 
Although Police Magistrates Wickham and his successor William Brown had at various times 
organised mounted police patrols of two constables to the Pine River and Sandgate this had 
not been sustainable on any regular basis.  There were proposals for a police station to be 
constructed at the mouth of the Brisbane River that could have readily accessed the coasts 
and islands of the bay but they appear to have come to nought.29  A small detachment of six 
troopers under the command of a sub-lieutenant of Native Police briefly patrolled the 
northern and coastal districts from June to September 1855 but it had not succeeded in 
limiting attacks on cattle at Whiteside nor in effecting any arrests.  Nonetheless its 
withdrawal owing to cutbacks to the force provoked another flowery Courier editorial which 
described its retraction as evil and emphasised the on-going impediment to development of 
Sandgate.30   
 
The Sandgate land purchasers in the face of this policing stalemate subsequently formed a 
committee to lobby the New South Wales government for protection for the coastal suburbs.  
It prepared a Memorial from concerned citizens and also took out paid advertising to promote 
its views.  The committee placed its ‘Notice to Government’ as a newspaper advertisement 
which ran from 22 March to the end of April 1856.  The purchasers were naturally aggrieved 
                                                 
28 MBC 29 September 1855, p. 2.   
29 MBC 7 June 1856, p. 2.   
30 MBC 29 September 1855, p. 2.   
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that the government had made a considerable profit on the land when it clearly did not have 
effective control over the district and their actual occupation had been made impossible by 
the local Ningy Ningy.  Their notice made clear that it was the Aboriginal tribes who 
controlled and occupied these lands and that the government had granted them deeds which 
could not be enforced: 
Know ye that the Marine Township of Sandgate, situated on the shore of Moreton 
Bay, only 12 miles from the Township of North Brisbane, and which township of 
Sandgate has all been sold by the Government, at prices averaging from 2 to 400 per 
cent. above the upset price; and know ye, by this notice, that all parties that have 
attempted to sit down on the said township, to erect dwellings, have been driven away 
by the blacks; and I now solemnly declare by this notice, that no person can attempt to 
make improvements on their purchased township allotments at Sandgate except at the 
risk to their lives; and which township to this day remains a wilderness.  And we by 
this notice pray ye for protection to enable us to build our houses thereon.   
Richard J. Coley. Chairman of Committee.31   
 
With the granting of self-government to New South Wales in 1856, elections for new 
representatives from the northern districts to the New South Wales parliament provided the 
local newspaper with a new focus to press for northern residents’ claims. The Courier’s 
priorities for the new members for the County and Boroughs of Stanley included ‘that 
dreaded and dangerous spot Sandgate’ at number three on its list.  It argued that these lands 
had been sold ‘on the implied if not express understanding that the buyers would be 
protected, in making improvements, from the assaults of the hostile tribes of aboriginals ... in 
this would-be Government township.’  The editorial acknowledged that previous 
                                                 
31 MBC 5 April 1856, p. 1.   
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governments had repeatedly recognised this need but it ignored the immense oganisational 
difficulties that any administration faced in providing the intensive on-the-ground “policing” 
required to claim lands which had never been ceded by the coastal tribes.  It described 
government inaction as ‘listlessly apathetic and evidently careless’.32   
 
Not surprisingly the new government replied favourably to the Sandgate committee but it 
also indirectly admitted it simply did not have the means to do anything.  In his new role of 
government resident Captain Wickham was advised that there was no means for supplying a 
Native Police Force for the district but that the current commandant, Lieutenant Morrisset, 
had been instructed to patrol the ‘disturbed portion of the Moreton Bay district’ whenever 
possible.  The Courier responded facetiously that it was ‘rather a roving commission for the 
gallant officer’ whose force now had responsibility for pacifying a district that extended from 
the Clarence and Macleay Rivers in the south to the Upper Dawson in the north, some 700 
kilometres north to south and a similar distance east to west, with just eighty-five men.33  
‘And also for the valiant sons of the soil who roam about Cabbage Tree Creek [at Sandgate]’ 
it added. 34  Clearly any claims to effective administrative control over these extensive lands 
at the time of self-government are highly problematic.   
 
Despite the insecurity of property, new settlers continued to take up cattle leases close to the 
older existing stations at the North and South Pine Rivers and north to Caboolture.   And the 
North Pine traditional owners continued to evict them.  A Mr Young tried to establish a cattle 
station in the vicinity of the Pine River but in September 1856 while he was absent in 
Brisbane 200 Aboriginal men descended on the station taking whatever they wanted and 
                                                 
32 MBC 26 April 1856, p. 2.   
33 L.E. Skinner, Police of the Pastoral Frontier: Native Police 1849-59, St Lucia Qld, 1975, pp. 374-77.   
34 MBC 31 May 1856, p. 3.   
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spearing several cattle.35  Just three weeks later between 300 and 400 men were waiting in 
ambush at a Mr Westaway’s new station on the North Pine.  Becoming aware of their plans 
Westaway and his servant who were both mounted atttempted to charge the gathering but the 
warriors simply urged the two white men on.  Realising that they were soon to be surrounded 
Westaway led a retreat back to their hut.  From there the servant fired blank shot which 
triggered a shower of waddies.  Now Westaway grasped that they were at even greater risk as 
the northern men prepared to storm the hut; he and his man fled but local creeks had recently 
flooded and they soon found conditions impossible for their horses; they finally reached the 
nearest station to the north on foot.  By the time they returned two days later on Monday 
morning the hut had been robbed of all his goods and provisions.  Westaway who spoke the 
local dialect reported that the local people had been joined by Durundur and Wide Bay 
peoples and claimed that the leader was one of the latter who called several times to him to 
go, ‘as plenty more blacks were coming, and pointed the direction that he was to take.’  Once 
again this alliance of northern peoples proved that they were in the ascendant on these, their 
own lands.  The Courier complained of ‘official incapacity and gross neglect in withholding 
protection to life and property’.36  
 
In the twelve months which followed, farmland was purchased at Bald Hills which would 
eventually come to define the city of Brisbane’s north-east boundary.  The hills abutted fine 
wetlands, tidal flats and mangroves of the South Pine River which were home to migratory 
birds and rich marine life and flowed to the bay.  The new settlers had been anxious about 
purchasing so close to Ningy Ningy heartlands and they and their family and friends added to 
the lobbying of the Government Resident for police protection.  By October 1857 the 
government had agreed to an expansion of the Native Police and a new detachment was to be 
                                                 
35 MBC 20 September 1856, p. 3 
36 MBC 11 October 1856, p. 3.   
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raised for the Moreton Bay district commencing January 1858.37  Until then Chief Constable 
Sneyd and a mounted District Constable undertook a weekly patrol of these northern districts.  
The Courier believed that the absence of Aborigines in these districts in the weeks that 
followed was proof that the police presence ‘restrained them’.  Certainly the local tribes were 
keeping an eye on police movements.  As the police patrolled on Wednesdays smoke signals 
floated into the air for miles along the bay as the coastal peoples warned their allies to stay 
clear.   
 
It is arguable then, as to how effectual this police authority actually was.  The rejection of 
white authority especially its expression through the Native Police was brought home 
forcefully in the last weeks of 1857.  A native trooper was sent to go among the northern 
tribes as far as Caboolture which would have taken him through several tribal territories to 
seek recruits for the Native Police expansion.  At some point on the journey the Aboriginal 
trooper was confronted by a Bribie Island warrior known as “Dr Ballow” who assaulted him 
with a butcher’s knife cutting the trooper’s arm ‘clean off by the shoulder’.  Aboriginal 
women hastily applied clay, their traditional method for treating wounds, but could not stem 
the flow and the man died the next day.  It was a gruesome expression of Bribie Islander 
rejection of colonial policing rather than the Courier’s naive belief that Aborigines simply 
found the Native Police pay too small and the work too hard.  This was the context for the 
smoke signals – they indicated a wary tactical pause rather than any diminution of Aboriginal 
assertion of their authority in these lands.38   
 
                                                 
37 MBC 31 October 1857, p. 2.  See also lobbying by Jordan and Zillman for protection at Caboolture in this 
same period, Skinner, Police of the Pastoral Frontier,  pp. 264-65.   
38 MBC 21 November 1857, p. 2.   
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 Despite the risk to security the government conducted further Sandgate land sales in 1855 
and again in 1858.39  As the amount of invested money increased, a group of Brisbane 
shareholders boldly planned the development of a boarding house or hotel at this pretty bay.40  
They met in August 1857 and by October a publican by the name of Loudon had commenced 
operations there.  Loudon also owned a hotel in Fortitude Valley and it seems likely that it 
was actually some of his staff rather than Loudon himself who were trying to get a Sandgate 
business up and running in these months.41  This business seems to have survived, unlike 
Dowse and others, by simply agreeing to local Aboriginal demands for provisions.  When the 
mounted police patrol visited they reported that ‘the blacks ... have proved troublesome to 
Mr. Loudon, getting almost everything they wanted by shear [sic] boldness in demanding it.’  
Police Magistrate Brown, himself a Sandgate landholder, promised to visit Loudon and do all 
he could until the Native Police detachment arrived.42    
 
A detachment of eight troopers under Lieutenant Williams promptly arrived in January 1858 
but no sooner had it commenced patrols around Sandgate than an attack on a station on the 
Logan River to the south of Brisbane resulted in it being called away.  Settler authorities did 
not have the capacity for more intensive paramilitary operations.  This was the context for the 
confident gathering of 300 men on Whiteside station in April and their attack on Lieutenant 
Williams’s patrol that this paper began with.  Having recommenced patrols in the north in 
April, this attack at Whiteside now reduced Williams’ detachment to five active troopers until 
Troopers Charlie and Mark recovered from their injuries.   
 
                                                 
39 MBC 27 January 1855, p. 2, 30 July 1855, p. 1, 11 September 1858 p. 2, & 27 October 1858, p. 3.   
40 MBC 1 August 1857, p. 1.   
41 See the report of the Native Police sergeant’s attempt to prosecute Loudon for refusing accommodation to him 
and a trooper at his hotel in the Valley in March 1858; MBC 7 April 1858, p. 2.   
42 MBC 31 October 1857, p. 2.   
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Mrs Griffin, the station owner, however had had enough.  Tom Petrie recalled a conversation 
with her son John Griffin whom he met at the North Pine in about 1859.  John told him that  
We can’t keep a beast down there for the blacks, they run them into the swamps and 
spear them, then have great feasts.  If any of us go down in that direction, we have 
always to be on our guard – that is the reason I am armed like this (touching his 
weapons [of two horse pistols and carbine hanging at his side]).43 
A few months later his mother sold the coastal portion of the Whiteside run which her family 
had held since 1843 to Tom Petrie.  It was a victory for Dalaipi, the Pine River elder whom 
Petrie had first approached to ask about good land for a run.  Petrie had grown up with local 
Aboriginal boys, spoke the local dialects fluently and without any trace of an accent, and had 
even been allowed to attend a kipper ceremony, (a secret ceremony which is part of male 
initiation rites) when he was thirteen or fourteen years old.  Now Dalaipi could guarantee his 
people’s movement across their lands; they had a white owner who was prepared to respect 
their sacred sites and allow their continued enjoyment of them.   The Pine River people’s 
sustained harassment had removed an unsympathetic and uncompromising owner and 
installed a European whom they trusted.  Tom Petrie was known among the Gubbi Gubbi as 
‘belonging to Dalaipi’ and he named his run Murrumba Downs, the local word for ‘good’.44   
 
As well as the “friendly” stations of Durundur45 and Petrie’s Murrumba Downs, Bribie Island 
continued to sustain a permanent Aboriginal village into the 1870s.  Aboriginal communal 
and ritual life survived despite the limitations on free movement.  The continuity of culture 
and law and the Aboriginal community’s creation of new forms of resistance into the 
                                                 
43 Petrie, Reminiscences, p. 180.   
44 Petrie, Reminiscences, pp. 178-87; see also Alex Bond, The Statesman, the Warrior and the Songman, 
Nambour Qld, 2009.   
45 David Archer who had founded Durundur Station in 1841 had allowed the local Dalla people to continue to 
hunt and move across their lands.  Although he sold the station to David and John McConnel in 1848, the 
McConnel’s continued to allow Aboriginal ceremonial activities on the station into the 1860s. Recollections of 
AJ McConnell 1856-1937, Box 3 Item 206, McConnell Family Collection, Fryer Library.    
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twentieth century is a separate strand of the sovereignty question, too large to be explored 
here.   
 
The battle for Sandgate was not so easily fought.  The strength of the Native Police 
detachment was eventually reinforced and by the end of 1859 it was led by the most 
notorious officer in the force’s brutal history, Lieutenant Frederick Wheeler.46  Despite the 
detachment’s activities over twenty-four months, conditions at Sandgate were still described 
as ‘in a rough state’ in 1859, although more houses were being constructed and pleasure visits 
to the seaside began to be advertised in the local press.47  Wheeler’s dominance was bolstered 
by the erection of Native Police barracks and horse paddocks right in the village of Sandgate 
in the course of the year 1859.48   
 
Wheeler ranged over a wide territory of southeast Queensland including the Sunshine Coast 
and Caboolture in an effort to break the alliance of the coastal and Sunshine Coast hinterland 
peoples.  Despite his ruthless rampages when he came across Aboriginal gatherings, 
Aboriginal people continued to evade his dispersals and to persist with their traditional 
meetings.49  In December 1862 four of his troopers deserted and he struggled to replace 
them.50  Then in 1865, one of his sergeants ordered the shooting of a “friendly” Aboriginal 
boat’s crew on the beach at Sandgate; this was not necessarily unusual police behaviour in 
the field, but such an operation within view of white residents was here deemed an atrocity 
by the local press.  The decision was made to close the Sandgate Native Police camp.51   
 
                                                 
46 MBC 3 December 1859, p. 2 
47 MBC 27 April 1859, p. 2.   
48 MBC 14 May 1859, p.1.   
49 Jonathan Richards, ‘Frederick Wheeler and the Sandgate Native Police Camp’, 20 Journal of the Royal 
Historical Society of Queensland,  Vol. 20, 2007, p. 115.   
50 Richards, ‘Frederick Wheeler’, p. 116.   
51 Richards, ‘Frederick Wheeler’, pp. 117-18.   
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Twelve years after the government of New South Wales had first granted land titles, the 
Europeans finally had effective control and actual occupation of this northern seaside suburb 
of Brisbane.  Clearly the occupation of Sandgate was by eight years of episodic paramilitary 
operations, ie it required conquest to achieve a hold over the northern suburbs of Brisbane.  
Since as Alexander Reilly reminds us the High Court of Australia has ruled that all statutory 
grants prior to 1975 were rightfully conferred,52 perhaps it does not matter in terms of the 
letter of the law.  For the most part histories such as the struggles to control Brisbane have 
been dismissed politically and legally as, in Benton’s words, ‘mere temporary formations on 
the way toward more evenly expansive territorial rule and settled sovereignties.’53  As 
Australian historical scholarship of the nation’s many frontiers develops, however, a picture 
of uneven political geography becomes the norm and the date at which sovereignty becomes 
settled, elusive.  It shows what an enormous task the Australian state still has before it in 
terms of establishing its right to deny Indigenous self-determination and sovereignty.  As 
Reynolds pointed out in 2005, ‘ultimately the Crown will be required to establish how and 
when Aboriginal sovereignty was overridden.’54  It took more than six years following the 
creation of the colony of Queensland to effectively control the outer suburbs of the capital.  
Detailed investigation of the Crown’s claim to control the remaining 99.99% of Aboriginal 
lands are likely to show a process that was as uneven, piecemeal and lacking in legitimacy as 
the northern suburbs of Brisbane.   
 
  
 
                                                 
52 ‘Responses to Henry Reynolds’, Macquarie Law Journal, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 23 
53 Benton, Search for Sovereignty, p. 3.   
54 Reynolds, ‘Reviving Indigenous Sovereignty?’ p. 6.   
 
 
 
